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Is a claim for post-employment victimisation currently permissible under the  
Equality Act 2010?   
 




This article provides an overview of the current legal rules dealing with post employment 
victimisation and an analysis of the nature and scope of the law on this issue in the United 
Kingdom. The main focus of the article is to consider the conflicting legal decisions in this area 
and the impact they have had.  Particularly, the detrimental effect the uncertainty arising from 
these cases has had and will continue to have on solicitors involved in claims and employees that 
have experienced this kind of victimisation. Finally the need for reform of the law in this area 
will be considered.  
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Introduction 
The law on post-employment victimisation is covered by the Equality Act 2010. 
However, the provisions dealing with post-employment victimisation are less favourable 
under the Act than under previous law and do not comply with the legal standards of the 
European Union. With respect to victimisation itself there are two sections of the 
Equality Act 2010 that apply.  Section 27, has been brought over from previous 
legislation and defines an action for victimisation. However, section 108 is a new 
section that implements the decisions in previous cases which allowed post-
employment actions for discrimination, harassment and victimisation. 1 However, this 
latter section was badly drafted and excludes protection for post-employment 
victimisation.  For people experiencing post-employment victimisation in the 
workplace the denial of legal protection for this type of behaviour can be a problem.  
                                       
1 Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd (No. 2) (1999) IRLR 452 
The very recent decision in the case of Onu v Akwiku 2 was an attempt by the EAT to 
address the inadequacies of the legislation in this respect. Unfortunately it contradicts 
the earlier decision of a differently constituted EAT on the same point which is likely 
to cause confusion. Before analysing these developments in detail it is important to set 
out the relevant law and how it has been interpreted.    
 
Victimisation  
The ordinary, day to day, non-legal meaning of the term victimisation in employment 
which it has been given over time is where an employer has treated or treats  a person 
or persons in his employment in an unfair or harsh manner. However, it has a more 
specific meaning in employment law which is different to this. Victimisation arises 
where an employee is involved in (e.g. by acting as a witness) or brings a 
discrimination claim against his employer during his employment and his employer 
responds by treating him in a discriminatory manner. The origins of the victimisation 
rules are uncertain but, historically US legislation had a strong influence of the 
content of the original Acts dealing with discrimination in the UK. 3 So it seems likely 
that US law was the original source. 4 However, European law has also been 
influential in the development of the law in this area.  Article 7 of the Equal 
Treatment Directive 5 called on member states to take the necessary steps to protect 
employees against dismissal by employers taken as responses to complaints within 
                                       
2 UKEAT/0022/12/RN  
 
3 Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Race Discrimination Act 1976 E.g. Indirect Discrimination rules and 
role of EOC in the UK derived from the US.  
4 It is referred to as a claim for retaliation in the United States and it is by far the most common type of 
discrimination claim. 
5 76/207/EEC 
their undertaking or to any legal proceedings brought against them and aimed at 
enforcing their compliance with the principle of equal treatment. 6  
Under section 27 of the Equality Act 2010, 7 victimisation occurs when: (1) A person 
(A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because (a) B does a 
protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act.8 
Section 27 (2) states that each of the following is a protected act (a) bringing 
proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with 
proceedings under this Act; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in 
connection with this Act; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or 
another person has contravened this Act. 9 In this context it means treating someone 
less favourably than others (those that have not undertaken a protected act) because 
that person has exercised, or intends to exercise, his/her rights under specific 
legislation. In Bruce v Addleshaw Booth & Co 10 the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
confirmed that complaints of victimisation can only be brought if the claimant can 
show that he has been subjected to discrimination of a type that is unlawful under the 
relevant legislation. The claimant would need to show that he has been subjected to a 
detriment representing victimisation during his employment or after.  
                                       
6 In the Coote case supra 1 the ECJ ruled that article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive included the 
right of a worker to make a post-termination claim. 
7 This statutory provision provides a right in respect of sex, race, disability, sexual orientation, religious 
and age discrimination outlawing victimisation of employees in specific circumstances.  
 
8 In Bouabdillah v Commerzbank ET/2203106/12 a London banker, fired for failing to disclose a 
sexual discrimination lawsuit against her former employer Deutsche Bank, won an employment 
tribunal for victimisation against Germany's Commerzbank.   
9  Employees (and, in some instances, workers) have the legal right not to be victimised, harassed or 
subjected to any other detriment for exercising (or proposing to exercise) certain of their statutory 
employment rights. They have the right not to be victimised etc. on grounds of sex, gender 
reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, race, disability, religion or belief, sexual orientation, age 
married or civil partner status.  
10 (2004) All ER (D) 218 (May) EAT 
The statutory concept of victimisation was usefully explained by Lord Nicholls in the 
case of Shamoon v Chief Constable of the RUC 11 as follows:  
"Persons who exercise their statutory rights are not to be penalised for doing so. 
Employers and others who retaliate in this way are guilty of discrimination. The 
victimisation provisions adopt substantially the same structure as the direct 
discrimination provisions, save only that the proscribed ground is different. In cases 
of direct discrimination, the proscribed ground is sex, or whatever. In cases of 
victimisation the proscribed ground is that the claimant committed one of the 
'protected acts'; for instance, that the claimant had brought proceedings under the 
Act…”  
Comparators 
As a claim for victimisation is based on a claimant experiencing inequality of 
treatment the correct approach in a victimisation case is to establish an appropriate 
comparator. The claimant must identify another employee who has not carried out a 
protected act under section 27 as the following quote suggests: …“ The definition of 
victimisation calls for a similar ‘less favourable treatment’ comparison. In the case of 
direct sex discrimination the comparison is between the treatment afforded to the 
claimant woman and that afforded to a man. In the case of victimisation the 
comparison is between the treatment afforded to the claimant and the treatment 
afforded to a person who has not committed a protected act.” 12 One of the most 
difficult aspects of a victimisation claim is determining the characteristics of the 
correct comparator.  That is a single employee or group of employees with whom the 
victimised employee compares himself to demonstrate he has suffered less favourable 
                                       
11 (2003) ICR 337 at paragraph 5 
12  Ibid 
treatment.  In TNT Express Worldwide (UK) Ltd v Brown 13 the Court of Appeal 
considered the relevant case law and 14 confirmed that the correct choice of a 
comparator was one of the central issues for determination in a victimsation claim. 
The Court set down three general rules for determining the validity of a victimisation 
claim. First, the employer by subjecting the employee to a detriment must have 
treated him less favourably than the employer would have treated other employees in 
the same circumstances. Secondly, the comparison must not include employees who 
have also undertaken a `protected act’ e.g. those that have also complained of an act 
of discrimination. Thirdly, the employer must have subjected the employee to less 
favourable treatment because he had undertaken a protected act. 
Causation 
In terms of the Act the question to be addressed is whether it has been established that 
the less favourable treatment that the claimant had suffered was ‘by reason that’ he 
had committed one or other of the protected acts. In deciding that question it will need 
to be established that the protected act had a ‘significant influence on the outcome’, 
irrespective of whether the respondents were consciously or unconsciously motivated 
by the fact that the claimant had undertaken a protected act as the following quote 
highlights. “ The legislature is attempting to provide for the situations where the 
motivation is, at the least, difficult to prove and, indeed, may not even be consciously 
acknowledged by the actor.” 15 It was decided by a majority of judges in the House of 
Lords in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport 16 that this type of causation needs 
                                       
13 (2001) ICR 182 
14 Particularly the case of Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police V Khan (2001) 
IRLR 830 (HL) considered below 
15 Rideout, R Dyson, J Rideout’s Principles of Labour Law (1983) 4th ed. Sweet and Maxwell p 321 
16 (2000) 1 AC 501 
to be established in victimisation cases. In Onu v Akwiku 17 the EAT in dealing with 
the question of causation in a case involving a threat made by an employer to a 
employee following a protected act confirmed that: “the statutory question is whether 
the victimisation 18 occurred because she had done so.  A realistic approach must be 
taken to any situation in which it is said a protected act has occurred… If the claim 
includes reference to allegations under the Equality Act then we do not see it as a 
precondition for the threat to be actionable that in the course of making it the 
perpetrator should expressly refer to that fact.  In context, here, Mr Akwiwu plainly 
knew of an action having been brought.  Although it covered more than a breach of 
the Equality Act, it covered that too.  The fact he did not single out the action under 
the Equality Act for specific mention when making a threat does not mean that his 
action was not taken, at least in part, in response to the bringing of proceedings under 
that Act...any detriment suffered from an act in response to the bringing of the claim 
is to be attributed to the bringing of the protected act.”  19 The EAT took a purposive 
approach to the case and readily attributed the threats made to the claimant (some 
time after she had left her employment) by her employer   as being in response to a 
race discrimination claim taken against him previously by her (without specific 
mention of it by him) and hence it was victimisation. 
Post employment discrimination 
The decision in Adekeye v The Post Office (No2) 20 remained good law until recently 
in respect of complaints of victimisation brought under previous legislation the Sex 
                                       
17 Appeal No. UKEAT/0283/12/RN & UKEAT/0022/12/RN 
 
18 Here, uttering a threat to the sister of the claimant about what he would do to her sister and her. 
19 Supra 21 Para. 110 
20 (1997) IRLR 105 
Discrimination Act 1975 21 and the Race Relations Act 1976. The EAT considered 
first whether the expression "a person employed" in section 4(2) of the Race Relations 
Act 1976 could properly be construed so as to include a former employee. They 
concluded that the expression meant "a person who is employed under a contract of 
employment and this meant that there was no protection for those persons no longer 
employed by him. 
In Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group PLC 22 the Employment Appeal Tribunal needed to 
clarify whether sex discrimination by an employer of a former employee that took 
place after the employment had terminated would be protected by the Sex 
Discrimination Act1975. 23 The law was already clear that in respect of post 
employment victimisation this was within the scope of the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975. 24 However, the issue was could a claimant make a claim for direct and indirect 
discrimination where they were an ex-employee or former job applicant. The EAT 
held that these forms of discrimination were not within the field of employment and 
therefore fell outside the SDA. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the EAT. 
However, this decision was overturned by the House of Lords in Relaxion Group v 
Rhys-Harper, D'Souza v London Borough of Lambeth, Jones v 3M Healthcare and 
three other actions. 25 They decided that an employment tribunal did have jurisdiction 
to consider a complaint of discrimination that relates only to acts that are alleged to 
have taken place after the complainant's employment has come to an end. 
                                       
21 Section 6(2) 
22 (2001) IRLR 460 CA 
23 Interpreted in line with the Equal Treatment Directive 
24 Supra 1 Coote 
25 (2003) IRLR 484 HL 
Under section 108 of the Equality Act post-employment discrimination and 
harassment are covered.  26 This section states that:  (1) A person (A) must not 
discriminate against another (B) if (a) the discrimination arises out of and is closely 
connected to a relationship which used to exist between them, and (b)conduct of a 
description constituting the discrimination would, if it occurred during the 
relationship, contravene this Act. Section 108 (2) states A person (A) must not harass 
another (B) if (a) the harassment arises out of and is closely connected to a 
relationship which used to exist between them, and (b) conduct of a description 
constituting the harassment would, if it occurred during the relationship, contravene 
this Act. 
Post-employment victimisation 
This article is about the legal position of a person who has been involved in, or 
brought, proceedings under equality law against his employer during his employment 
but, has been victimised because of it after he has left his employment. What type of 
behaviour on the part of the employer is this likely to be? The action could be refusing 
an employee a reference as in the Jessemy or Coote case 27 or denying him some term 
or condition of his contract which he is entitled to e.g. outstanding wage or bonus. In 
Oku below it was a threat made by an employer to his employee via her sister and in 




                                       
26 Unlike victimisation which is excluded. 
27 Middlemiss, S Employers Liability for Employee References and Victimisation, Statute Law Review 
(OUP) (2012 ) Vol. 33 Part 4  
 
Post - Termination Victimisation 
The liability of employers for victimisation arising after a contract of employment has 
ended was first established in the case of Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd. (no 2). 28 
Ms Coote argued that after her dismissal by her former employer he had victimised 
her by failing to provide her with a reference relating her employment. She had 
pursued a claim against her employer for sex discrimination alleging that his action in 
dismissing her had been motivated by her pregnancy and the claim was settled out of 
court. Ms Coote then brought a claim against her employer for victimisation by failing 
to provide her with a reference. This claim was unsuccessful at the Employment 
Tribunal stage as it was held that she was not in employment at the time of the act of 
victimisation and accordingly the tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the complaint. 
On appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal they referred the matter to the 
European Court of Justice for guidance on the applicability of the Equal Treatment 
Directive 29 to victimisation which occurred after the employment relationship had 
ended. The ECJ held that the Directive applied to this type of behaviour and required 
member states to introduce measures to protect workers from this type of post 
employment discrimination. Following the ECJ decision the EAT upheld Ms Coote’s 
claim for victimisation under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. The UK 
Government’s response to the Coote decision was to introduce legal rules that 
protected against post-employment discrimination which are now contained in section 
108 of the Equality Act 2010. This makes discrimination, which arises out of an 
employment relationship which has ended, unlawful. However, section 108(7) 
specifically excludes victimisation. This exclusion is acknowledged by the current 
                                       
28 (1998) IRLR 656 
 
29 1976/207 EEC 
Government as a drafting mistake however, it does exclude the possibility of the type 
of claim in the Coote case being brought under this section.  
Section 108 of the Equality Act 
This section of the Act gives the right to a claimant to bring an action against her 
employer after the contract has ended. In respect of discrimination it states that: (1) A 
person (A) must not discriminate against another (B) if (a) the discrimination arises 
out of and is closely connected to a relationship which used to exist between them 
…30 However, post-employment victimisation is excluded under section 108 (7) 
which states that conduct is not a contravention of this section in so far as it also 
amounts to victimisation of B by A. This provision denies the right to post-
employment protection that was provided to employees by the ECJ in the Coote case 
and could be subject to challenge.  The Government have admitted that this is a 
drafting error which will be sorted out but, in the meantime pointed out that there is 
still a remedy under the Act which can be provided in line with section 27 of the 
Equality Act 2010, previous UK statute law, the Equal Treatment Directive 31 and 
relevant case law. The case law below illustrates the difficulties caused by this error 
and the need for the section to be amended as a matter of urgency. In the meantime 
claimants will need to overcome various hurdles to establish the legitimacy of their 
claim. 
 
                                       
30 Also regarding harassment it states the following at s 108 (2): A person (A) must not harass another 
(B) if (a)the harassment arises out of and is closely connected to a relationship which used to exist 
between them, and  (b) conduct of a description constituting the harassment would, if it occurred 
during the relationship, contravene this Act.  
 
31 1976/207 EEC or Supra 10 General Framework Directive for Equal Treatment in Employment and 
Occupation 
Relevant Case Law 
 
Following the Coote decision the tribunals extended the right to employees to make a 
post-employment claim.  Similarly in Shoebridge v Metropolitan Police Services 32 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld an employment tribunal finding that it had 
jurisdiction to hear a complaint of victimisation relating to events 14 months after the 
employment had ended. Also in (1) Walker (2) Premier Model Management Ltd v (1) 
BHS Ltd (2) Hough 33 the EAT held that discriminatory acts that took place after the 
termination of the employee's employment were deemed to have sufficient proximity 
to the employment relationship so as to give rise to a continuing act of sex 
discrimination for the purposes of a claim under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 
The situation changed with the decision of Rowstock Limited v Jessemy 34 where it 
was held that victimisation of an employee after his employment had ended did not 
give him a right to complain to an employment tribunal. The Equality Act 2010 did 
not cover victimisation against a worker after he had left his job.  
The facts in Rowstock were that Mr Jessemy issued a claim against his former 
employer Rowstock Ltd for unfair dismissal and age discrimination having been 
dismissed on the ground of retirement before his 66th birthday and those claims were 
successful. Also his employer had provided an unfavourable reference and Jessemy 
added a complaint of post-employment victimisation to his other complaints, arguing 
that the reason for the poor reference was his complaint of age discrimination. The 
tribunal conceded that Mr Jessemy’s ex-employer had provided a poor reference 
                                       
32 (2004) All ER (D) 87 (Jul) EAT 
33 EAT/0001/05 
34 UKEAT/0112/12; (2013) EMPLR 023 
 
about him which limited his ability to obtain alternative employment. However, they 
rejected his victimisation claim on the basis that under section108 (7) of the Act 35 
they had no jurisdiction to hear it. Mr Jessemy appealed against the tribunal decision 
arguing that Parliament could not have intended to remove this protection and that the 
Tribunal did have jurisdiction to hear his claim. The EAT dismissed his appeal on the 
basis that the wording of section 108(7) is clear and tribunals are required to observe 
the letter of the law. 36 In its judgment, the EAT said that, “the literal words of section 
108(7)…produce a lacuna in the statutory scheme of protection from discrimination, 
harassment and victimisation which the UK is required by EU legislation to enact.” 
Although it recognised that it was unlikely that post-employment victimisation had 
been intentionally excluded under this section, it said the real question is whether the 
EAT had the power “to plug the gap or eliminate the lacuna”. The EAT concluded 
that its judicial role does not extend as far as amending primary statutes. However, it 
did grant permission to Mr Jessemy to appeal on this point to the Court of Appeal and 
the outcome of this appeal is eagerly awaited. The general consensus among 
practitioners is that post-employment victimisation is important and needs protection.  
However, a differently constituted EAT in the recent case of Onu v Akwiku, 37 
disagreed with the decision in Rowstock and argued it was wrongly decided. The 
Claimant was a domestic servant who had brought a claim against her previous 
employers for, amongst other things, victimisation after she had left her employment. 
The Employment Tribunal held that victimisation was not made out on the facts. The 
claimant appealed at which point the respondent introduced a new argument that post-
                                       
35 Which excludes claims for post-employment victimisation 
36 The tribunal was not directed to the leading case on the earlier legislation, Rhys-Harper v Relaxion 
Group, and so it is possible that it would have come to a different result if it had been considered. 
37 UKEAT/0022/12/RN 
employment victimisation claims were precluded by virtue of s. 108(7) of the 
Equality Act.  The EAT held that construction of the Act was to be approached in two 
stages. Firstly, the meaning of the Act was to be ascertained as if it was a purely 
domestic statute. If the result of the interpretation of domestic law was it was contrary 
to the requirements of the Equal Treatment Directive, then the second stage was to 
consider whether the Act could be interpreted in accordance with the obligations on 
member states under the Directive. The EAT concluded that the domestic construction 
of the Equality Act 2010 permitted employees to bring claims for acts of victimisation 
that took place after their employment had ended. It thought that the contrary decision 
in the Rowstock case had been wrongly decided. In dealing with the question of 
statutory interpretation and why the Equality Act should be interpreted to include the 
right to bring an action the following was stated: “The central difficulty is that the 
Equality Act 2010 does not expressly provide that victimisation of a former employee 
by her erstwhile employer is compensatable, whereas it does provide specifically that 
both discrimination and harassment occurring after termination of the employment 
relationship are, and it would seem all too easy for Parliament to have added a similar 
provision in respect of victimisation post-dating the termination of an employment to 
give rise to a claim if that is what it had intended. Yet that is what European 
Directives would require it to do;  it is what the House of Lords recognised was 
provided by the predecessor statutes (here the Race Relations Act) by its decision in 
Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group [2003] IRLR 484 HL; it is what the Code of Guidance 
to the Equality Act asserts the effect of the Act is; and although the Act is not 
expressly a consolidating statute, there is no Parliamentary material which suggests 
that the legislature considered for one moment that the effect of what is was doing 
might be to provide for such a dramatic shift in the law.” 38 
Conclusion 
The type of action taken by an employer in the workplace that can represent a form of 
victimisation is extensive as illustrated by the case law. Despite this the legislation 
still specifically excludes post employment victimisation claims. Where this rule has 
been applied strictly according to statute by a tribunal or court (E.g. Jessemy) it has 
been viewed by some commentators and judges as acting contrary to the intentions of 
the judiciary and Parliament. This was the view taken by the EAT in the case of Onu 
v Akwiku  which disagreed with the decision in Jessemy case and concluded that 
post-employment victimisation is caught by the Equality Act 2010. As there are now 
two inconsistent EAT decisions, permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal has been 
granted (alongwith the linked appeal of Taiwo v Olaigbe 39).  While the Court of 
Appeal may provide an interim conclusion on the correct construction of the legal 
rules what is needed is a statutory change.  However, given the Government’s 
apparent resistance to this change may come through the Court of Appeal in their 
judgement on this issue. It may try to resolve the problem (in the absence of statutory 
change) and make further appeal unnecessary. However, what is more likely is that a 
challenge to the legislation will be presented to the Court of Justice on the basis that it 
is contrary to EU law.  
                                       
38 Justice Langstaff at paragraph 60  
39 [2013] UKEAT 0254_12_0503 Taiwo was employed as a live-in nanny/housekeeper working under 
a migrant worker visa. After leaving her employment she brought a race discrimination claim alleging 
ill treatment and abuse by her former employers. They in turn contacted the UK Border Agency 
requesting that they investigate T’s immigration status. As a result, T brought a second employment 
tribunal claim alleging race discrimination, harassment and victimisation, relating to these post 
employment acts. 
